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Abstract We examine the relationship between confidence in own absolute perfor-
mance and risk attitudes using two confidence elicitation procedures: self-reported
(non-incentivised) confidence and an incentivised procedure that elicits the certainty
equivalent of a bet based on performance. The former procedure reproduces the Bhard-
easy effect^ (underconfidence in easy tasks and overconfidence in hard tasks) found in
a large number of studies using non-incentivised self-reports. The latter procedure
produces general underconfidence, which is significantly reduced, but not eliminated
when we filter out the effects of risk attitudes. Finally, we find that self-reported
confidence correlates significantly with features of individual risk attitudes including
parameters of individual probability weighting.
Keywords Overconfidence . Underconfidence . Experiment . Risk preferences
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1 Introduction
In this paper we report an experiment investigating relationships between measures of
individuals’ confidence assessments of their own performance and their risk attitudes.
Our broad motivation flows from a large literature originating in psychology in the
1970s and documenting apparently systematic biases in individuals’ assessments of their
own abilities, both relative to others and in absolute terms. For example, a classic
experimental approach to eliciting absolute confidence might ask subjects to respond to
various quiz questions with right and wrong answers and then to report assessments of
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their own performance (e.g., by responding to questions of roughly the form Bhow many
questions do you think you got right?^ or Bhow likely is that you got this question right?^).
A range of studies using approaches like this, starting with the classic study of Fischhoff
et al. (1977), document systematic miscalibration, usually in the form of either overcon-
fidence (i.e., over-predicting own actual success rate) or a hard-easy effect (i.e.,
overestimating success for ‘hard’ tasks and underestimating success for ‘easy’ ones).1
This literature has, in turn, stimulated significant streams of work in both empirical
and, more recently, theoretical economics. For example, findings of overconfidence in
own performance relative to that of others (e.g., Svenson 1981) has motivated many
studies by experimental economists on the relationship between relative confidence,
relative ability, and willingness to take risks in strategic environments (e.g., Camerer
and Lovallo 1999; Hoelzl and Rustichini 2005; Moore and Cain 2007; Niederle and
Vesterlund 2007). Confidence about own abilities has been shown to affect many
important spheres of economic behaviour including consumer decision making
(Grubb 2015), trading in financial markets (Biais et al. 2005; Kent and Hirshleifer
2015), innovative activity (Herz et al. 2014), investment in education (Dunning et al.
2004), and decision making among managers and CEOs (Malmendier and Tate 2015).
Given this, it is not surprising that economists have shown interest in developing
theoretical models to examine the implications of biases in confidence (e.g., Compte
and Postlewaite 2004; Dubra 2004; Gervais et al. 2011; Ludwig et al. 2011).2
Our study has two primary motivations. One flows from an apparent clash between
particular stylized findings from the established psychological literature and more
recent evidence emerging from experimental economics. We discuss the relevant
evidence in more detail in the next section, but the crucial motivating feature to note
is that the recent evidence from experimental economics has tended to reveal either
much less evidence of systematic miscalibration or strikingly different patterns of
miscalibration where it does occur. So, what might account for this difference? One
distinctive feature of much of the newer literature is that it employs various (financial)
incentive mechanisms to motivate revelation of confidence, whereas the psychology
studies tended to rely on non-incentivised self-reported confidence. One possibly
tempting—though in fact it will turn out misleading—diagnosis would be that the
newer evidence provides more accurate confidence measurement as a consequence of
incentivised revelation techniques. In this paper, however, we investigate another
possibility: that some of the differences between findings of economists and psychol-
ogists may be a consequence of biases in measured confidence induced by incentive
mechanisms which fail to control for the influence of individual risk attitudes.
Our second motivation is to explore the possibility that confidence judgements may
be intrinsically related to risk attitudes. It seems plausible that there could be a positive
association between individuals being more confident in their own performance and
being more willing to take risks. For example, overconfidence about own abilities and a
willingness to take risks might be common consequences of particular personality traits
1 Other early studies include Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1981) and Lichtenstein et al. (1982). See Keren
(1991) or Alba and Hutchinson (2000) for reviews.
2 A related literature in psychology has challenged the interpretation of findings from miscalibration studies,
arguing that observed overconfidence and the hard-easy effect may be partly artefacts of the confidence
elicitation tools and/or methods used to analyse data, rather than biases in individual information-processing
(see Olsson (2014) for a review).
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(e.g., egotism), emotional states or dispositions (e.g., optimism). While these consid-
erations suggest a possible linkage between individual confidence assessments and risk
attitudes, as far as we know, there is no existing evidence to support such linkage.
In Section 2, we underpin the two motivations just highlighted with a more detailed
discussion of key aspects of the background experimental literature, with particular
focus on evidence related to assessments of absolute confidence.
Section 3 then introduces our experimental design. This has two core components: one
involves the use of two distinct methods for the elicitation of (absolute) confidence; the
other involves procedures for independently measuring individual risk attitudes. One of
our confidence measurement tools is a non-incentivised tool designed to be analogous to
procedures that have been used extensively in psychological research; the other is an
incentivised choice based procedure. We designed the latter to be incentive compatible for
revelation of confidence for risk neutral subjects but, in common with other incentive
mechanisms that have been used in the recent literature, our procedure will result in biased
confidence measurements for non-risk-neutral subjects. Thus, we use elicited risk attitudes
to adjust incentivised confidence measures for departures from risk neutrality. We also
examine whether individual risk attitudes predict self-reported (non-incentivised) confi-
dence judgements. In the implementation of the design (explained in detail in Section 3),
measurement of risk attitudes precedes elicitation of confidence. In presenting the design,
however, we begin by introducing our tools for confidence measurement.
In Section 4 we present our results. There are three primary findings. First, our two
tools produce markedly different patterns of confidence miscalibration, mimicking the
stylised facts of existing research (the non-incentivized tool reproduces the familiar
hard-easy effect, while our incentivised tool reveals general underconfidence). Second,
when we filter out the effects of risk attitudes on incentivised measurements of
confidence, we find that measured miscalibration is much reduced. This shows that
incentivised mechanisms for confidence elicitation can be biased in the absence of
suitable controls for risk preferences. Finally, we find that confidence, as measured by
non-incentivized self-reports, correlates significantly with features of individual risk
attitudes including parameters of individual probability weighting functions. Moreover
the directions of association are intuitively plausible: for example, reported confidence
is positively associated with risk parameters that imply greater willingness to take risk.
Section 5 discusses broader implications and concludes.
2 Background literature
In this section, we review dimensions of the literature relating to confidence
miscalibration which are most closely related to, and motivate, our contribution.
Because we are interested in possible relationships between individuals’ confidence
judgements and their risk attitudes, which we interpret as features of individuals, we
focus mainly on evidence related to the calibration of own absolute performance.3
3 In our experiment we focus exclusively on absolute, rather than relative, confidence judgements. Note that
biases in judgements about relative performance may reflect misperceptions about own performance or the
performance of others, and measurement of judgements about relative performance may be complicated by
strategic and/or social comparison concerns. Our focus on absolute confidence avoids such complications.
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We begin by looking more closely at our earlier assertion that recent
research by experimental economists has revealed rather different patterns in
(absolute) confidence miscalibration compared to the earlier psychology litera-
ture. One of the first papers in experimental economics to study absolute
confidence miscalibration is by Blavatskyy (2009). In his experiment, subjects
answer a set of 10 multiple choice quiz questions before choosing between two
payment schemes. Either one question is selected at random and the subject
receives a payoff if they answered this question correctly, or the subject
receives the same payoff with a stated probability set by the experimenter to
be equal to the percentage of correctly answered questions (although the subject
does not know this is how the probability is set). Subjects could also indicate
indifference. The majority choose the second payment scheme which
Blavatskyy interprets as reflecting a tendency towards underconfidence. He also
elicits risk attitudes in a separate part of the experiment but finds no significant
relationship between these risk attitudes and choices of payment scheme. In our
study, by contrast and as explained below, we do find significant correlations
between risk attitudes and confidence.4
In a related contribution, Urbig et al. (2009) elicit confidence about own
performance over a set of 10 multiple choice quiz questions. They use an
incentivized mechanism that elicits confidence via probability equivalents for
bets based on own performance. In their data the average elicited probability
equivalent is extremely close to the actual rate of success. Both Blavatskyy
(2009) and Urbig et al. (2009) note the difference between their findings and
those from the earlier psychology literature, and speculate that the difference
may be due to the introduction of incentivized elicitation devices. However,
neither study contains a benchmark treatment for comparing the elicited confi-
dence with a non-incentivized tool. Our study includes such a comparison.
Clark and Friesen (2009) study subjects’ confidence in relation to two types
of real effort tasks involving verbal and numerical skills. They study forecasts
of own performance using quadratic scoring rule (QSR) incentives and find that
underconfidence is more prevalent than overconfidence. One potential limitation
of QSR incentives, however, is that they may result in biased measurements of
confidence if subjects are not risk neutral. Recognizing this Clark & Friesen
use a binary lottery incentive procedure which, for an expected utility maxi-
mizer, induces risk neutrality. However, departures from expected utility theo-
ry—for example due to non-linear probability weighting—may result in the
procedure failing to induce risk neutrality (we return to this point below in
more detail).5
4 There are various differences between our methodologies that might explain this key difference in findings.
For example, Blavatskyy (2009) does not directly elicit confidence measures, as we do, but rather infers
underconfidence from the choice of payment scheme. As such, his measure of an individual’s confidence is
rather coarse, potentially limiting his analysis of the relation between individual risk attitudes and confidence.
Our measurement of risk attitudes is more detailed and also allows us to distinguish attitudes to consequences
and attitudes to chance.
5 Clark and Friesen (2009) also study forecasts of relative performance and compare (QSR) incentivized
forecasts with non-incentivized forecasts. They find little if any effect of incentives on calibration.
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A potentially significant feature of the three experiments discussed in the last three
paragraphs is that they all elicit confidence in relation to performance across sets of
tasks. By contrast, much of the earlier psychological literature investigating confidence
calibration assessed it with reference to performance in single tasks. This may be a
significant distinction because there is evidence that miscalibration varies between
measurements based on single versus sets of tasks. For example, Gigerenzer et al.
(1991), Liberman (2004) and Griffin and Brenner (2008) report that when beliefs are
elicited about aggregate performance in sets of tasks most subjects are either well-
calibrated or underconfident whereas overconfidence is evident when elicitation is at
the single task level. We study confidence on a single task level. Hence our evidence is
more directly comparable with the original confidence calibration studies.
Hollard et al. (2015) elicit absolute confidence in relation to single tasks and
compare confidence in visual perception and quiz tasks contrasting three elic-
itation tools: non-incentivized self-reports; the QSR; and the Becker-deGroot-
Marschak (BDM) mechanism. They find highest overconfidence in the non-
incentivized self-reports followed by BDM and then QSR. BDM-elicited confi-
dence being higher than QSR-elicited confidence is consistent with the effects
of risk aversion, but since they do not elicit risk attitudes we cannot tell
whether that difference is caused by risk attitudes or something else, such as
differences in understanding of the elicitation procedures. With our methodol-
ogy we will be able to identify the extent to which elicited confidence is
affected by risk attitudes.
Our study is also related to a growing literature on elicitation of subjective
beliefs. Offerman et al. (2009); Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015) and
Andersen et al. (2014) elicit subjects’ beliefs about uncertain events in a two-
step process, using estimates of individual risk attitudes to filter out the effect
of risk attitudes from measured beliefs. Our experiment also uses estimated risk
attitudes to filter out the effect of risk attitudes from beliefs but a key
difference is that we are concerned with biases in subjective estimates of
confidence in own performance (not biases in assessments of naturally deter-
mined chance events). A second difference from these studies is that we use the
parametric method developed by Fehr-Duda et al. (2006) to estimate individual
risk attitudes under rank-dependent utility (RDU) theories. This method gives
us a rich measure of risk attitudes which separates attitudes to consequences
from attitudes to probabilities. In our analysis, we use the measured risk
attitudes for two distinct purposes: first, by comparing risk-adjusted to unad-
justed confidence we are able to track the effect of risk attitudes on confidence
elicited using our incentivized mechanism; second, by relating measured risk
attitudes to (non-incentivised) self-reported confidence we are able to test for an
intrinsic relationship between confidence and risk attitudes.
Our exploration of the relationship between risk attitudes and confidence
connects with previous studies investigating links between other individual
characteristics and confidence. Some studies have focused on gender differ-
ences and find that overconfidence is more pronounced among men than
women (see Croson and Gneezy 2009 for a discussion of some of these).
However other studies, for example Clark and Friesen (2009), find no gender
differences in confidence. More recently, there has been interest in how
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personality traits and economic preferences interact. For example, it has been
found that personality traits such as openness and extraversion predict confi-
dence and overconfidence, respectively (Schaefer et al. 2004); neuroticism and
cognitive ability predict risk taking (Rustichini et al. 2012); and narcissism
predicts higher confidence and more willingness to bet on one’s own perfor-
mance (Campbell et al. 2004). Becker et al. (2012) review the relationships
between economic preferences and psychological personality traits, finding
mixed evidence on associations between risk preferences and personality traits.
In their own data, these authors find only weak correlations between risk
preferences and personality traits, and their best model for predicting life
outcomes such as health, earnings and education includes both personality
traits and risk preferences. None of these studies, however, report how risk
attitudes correlate with elicited confidence at the individual level. This is a
significant gap which our study seeks to address.
3 Methods
Our experiment had two parts. In the first part, we used a procedure (common
across all subjects, and explained in detail later) to elicit risk attitudes. In the
second part, we measured confidence about own performance in the context of
a standard quiz framework, using two different techniques, which we now
explain.
In Part 2 of the experiment, subjects responded to a series of two-item multiple-
choice questions, each of which asked them to judge which of a pair of cities had the
highest population. Subjects could earn £0.50 for each correct answer. The quiz is
included as Appendix A.
For each quiz response, we elicited a measure of confidence. We employed
two different procedures for measuring confidence implemented in two treat-
ments in a between subjects design. In the Reported Confidence treatment, we
elicited confidence using a simple non-incentivised self-report. Our method
was as follows: alongside each quiz answer the subject completed the
statement:
I am ___% confident that my answer is correct.
In the Inferred Confidence treatment we measured confidence using a new
incentivised procedure. Figure 1 illustrates the tool which has a choice list format.6
At the top of the figure, the subject has to choose which of two cities has the higher
population. They are then required to complete the table below the quiz question
choosing either A or B in each of the 20 rows.
6 A choice list elicitation procedure was used as early as Cohen et al. (1987) to elicit risk preferences.
Andersen et al. (2006) and Isoni et al. (2011) extensively discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using
choice lists as elicitation tools. We use choice lists mainly because of the clear interpretable framework of the
decision environment (the value of betting on one’s own answer) and the relative ease with which subjects
may see that truthful revelation is in their best interest.
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Given the construction of the table, subjects are expected to choose Option B in the
first row and Option A in the last row. At some point they will likely switch from
Option B to A, and this switchpoint is used to measure their confidence in their answer.
For example, suppose a subject thinks she has a 67% chance of being correct. Her
expected earnings from Option A are £6.70 and so if she wants to maximise her
expected earnings she should switch from B to A at row 8. We will refer to these
switchpoints as certainty equivalents (CE) and under expected value maximisation
(EV) the CE can be interpreted as revealing an individual’s subjective probability of
success (±2.5%).
More generally, the CE picks up some mix of assessment of their chances of success
with (possibly several) aspects of risk attitudes including non-linear attitudes to conse-
quences and probabilities. For example, if the subject is a risk averse expected utility
maximiser she will switch at a later row. If we were to incorrectly assume that this
subject makes choices according to the EV model, we would interpret this later
switchpoint as indicating a lower subjective probability of success. In this case our
estimate of the subject’s confidence would be biased and, even if the individual is
perfectly calibrated in that her subjective probability accurately reflects her underlying
performance, we would incorrectly record underconfidence. Similarly, if choices are
made based on non-linear attitudes to probabilities, we would obtain biased measures
of confidence if we were to infer confidence through the lens of a model that fails to
incorporate these attitudes, and as a result we would attribute systematic miscalibration
to well-calibrated subjects.
Which of the following cities has the larger population? 
 City X   City Y 
Tick one of the boxes to indicate your answer. 
In each row of the table choose either Option A or B.
Row Option A: Lottery 
Your Choice Option B: 
Guaranteed 
Amount A             B 
1 
You get £10.00 if 
your city choice is 
correct and £0.00 if 
not 
£10.00 
2 £9.50 
3 £9.00 
4 £8.50 
5 £8.00 
6 £7.50 
7 £7.00 
8 £6.50 
9 £6.00 
10 £5.50 
11 £5.00 
12 £4.50 
13 £4.00 
14 £3.50 
15 £3.00 
16 £2.50 
17 £2.00 
18 £1.50 
19 £1.00 
20 £0.50 
Fig. 1 Our incentivised confidence elicitation tool
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To allow for non-linear attitudes to consequences and/or probabilities we
infer confidence from CEs using one of the most common and parsimonious
specifications for risk preferences, Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) theory. Under
RDU, there should be a unique switchpoint at which the utility of the certainty
equivalent will be (approximately) equal to the value of the lottery.7 Hence,
under the RDU model (which contains expected utility and expected value
theories as special cases) we may write:
U CEið Þ ¼ U £10ð Þw Conf ið Þ þ U £0ð Þ 1−w Conf ið Þð Þ ð1Þ
where CEi is an individual’s certainty equivalent for question i, U(.) is a utility
function defined on money payoffs and w(.) is an RDU probability weighting
function. In expression (1) we treat confidence as a subjective probability
judgement that underlies choices, but may be prone to biases and
miscalibration. The function w(.) is then interpreted as capturing attitudes to
chance distinct from miscalibration.8 Rearranging Eq. (1) we obtain the prob-
ability that a subject assigns to being correct in question i, denoted Confi, as:
Conf i ¼ w−1
U CEið Þ−U £0ð Þ
U £10ð Þ−U £0ð Þ
 
ð2Þ
Under the EV model both the value function and the probability weighting function
are linear so confidence can be inferred directly from an observed CE as Confi=CEi/10.
Estimation under the RDU model requires knowledge of both the utility function and
the probability weighting function.
Part 1 of the experiment required subjects to make a series of lottery choices, from
which we estimate individual risk attitudes in the form of their utility and probability
weighting functions. We use these estimates to filter out the effects of risk attitudes on
elicited confidence in our incentivized procedure and to study the relationship between
individual confidence and risk attitude. For the purpose of estimating U(.) and w(.), we
use a simple and easy to understand procedure introduced in Fehr-Duda et al. (2006)
and successfully employed to estimate utility function and probability weighting
function parameters in several subsequent studies (including: Bruhin et al. 2010;
Fehr-Duda et al. 2010; and Epper et al. 2011). Because it uses a choice list elicitation
task which is very similar in structure to our incentivised confidence elicitation task, it
is particularly well suited to our study as its use minimises the cognitive load involved
in subjects learning how to respond to the two types of task.
The procedure requires each subject to complete 25 tables of the form given in
Fig. 2. Each table consists of 20 rows, where each row is a choice between a two-
outcome lottery and a guaranteed amount of money, with the guaranteed amount of
money decreasing from the high outcome to the low outcome of the lottery in equal
7 For compactness, the discussion now proceeds as if CE is revealed accurately by our procedure but the
reader should keep in mind that there is, of course, an element of approximation.
8 In the literature on prospect theory, probability weights are sometimes interpreted as reflecting misperception
of underlying probabilities, sometimes reflecting subjective attitudes to chance, and sometimes a mixture of
the two. For discussion and a formalisation following the latter mixed approach, see Abdellaoui et al. (2011).
For a thorough discussion of prospect theoretic models see Wakker (2010).
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increments moving down the rows. The subject’s certainty equivalent, CEL, of lottery L
can be written as in (3), where the high prize of the lottery x1L occurs with probability
p1L and the low prize of the lottery x2L occurs otherwise:
U CELð Þ ¼ U x1Lð Þw p1Lð Þ þ U x2Lð Þ 1−w p1Lð Þð Þ: ð3Þ
We use the switching point from choosing the guaranteed amount (Option B) to the
lottery L (Option A) as our estimate of the subject’s certainty equivalent of the lottery.
The 25 lotteries are summarized in Table 1 and were adapted from Fehr-Duda et al.
(2006).
To estimate U(.) and w(.) we first specify functional forms for utility and probability
weighting functions. We follow Bruhin et al. (2010) in their choice of flexible and
interpretable functions which have been widely used elsewhere in the empirical
literature. On this basis we use the power form for the utility function:
U xð Þ ¼ xα: ð4Þ
This specification is parsimonious in modelling risk attitudes via a single
curvature parameter, α, and has been shown to provide a good fit to a wide
range of choice data. To allow for non-linear probability weighting in the
For each row of the table please choose either Option A or B. 
Row 
Option A: 
Lottery 
Your Choice Option B: 
Guaranteed amount of A B 
1 
50% chance of £10.00 
and 
50% chance of £0.00 
£10.00 
2 £9.50 
3 £9.00 
4 £8.50 
5 £8.00 
6 £7.50 
7 £7.00 
8 £6.50 
9 £6.00 
10 £5.50 
11 £5.00 
12 £4.50 
13 £4.00 
14 £3.50 
15 £3.00 
16 £2.50 
17 £2.00 
18 £1.50 
19 £1.00 
20 £0.50 
Fig. 2 Sample table for risk attitude elicitation (Part 1 of the experiment)
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estimation of RDU parameters, we use the linear-in-log-odds function of Gold-
stein and Einhorn (1987):
w pð Þ ¼ βp
γ
βpγ þ 1−pð Þγ : ð5Þ
This specification is credited with providing a good account of individual heteroge-
neity (Wu et al. 2004) and its two parameters have the advantage of having clear
intuitive interpretations (Lattimore et al. 1992; Bruhin et al. 2010): the parameter β
captures ‘elevation’ of the probability weighting function (with greater β reflecting
more ‘optimism’); the parameter γ controls curvature (for γ<1, the smaller is γ the
stronger is the deviation from linearity).
Finally, operationalizing the model requires specification of some stochastic element
in the decision process. Following Epper et al. (2011) we assume that the observed
switching point, cCEL is given by:
cCEL ¼ CEL þ ϵL; ð6Þ
where the error terms, ϵL, are independent draws from a normal distribution
with zero mean. Heteroskedasticity in the error variance across elicitation tables
is accounted for, as in Epper et al. (2011), by assuming the standard deviation
of the distribution of the error term, vL, is proportional to the difference
between the guaranteed amounts in Option B as one moves down the rows
of the table. Hence, vL= v(x1L− x2L), where v denotes an additional parameter to
be estimated. The normalized standard deviation v, and the parameters of U(.)
and w(.), are then obtained by maximum likelihood estimation.
Table 1 Lotteries used in Part 1 of the experiment
Lottery p x1 x2 Lottery p x1 x2
1 0.05 £4 £0 14 0.5 £10 £0
2 0.05 £8 £2 15 0.5 £10 £4
3 0.05 £10 £4 16 0.5 £30 £0
4 0.05 £30 £10 17 0.75 £4 £0
5 0.1 £2 £0 18 0.75 £8 £2
6 0.1 £4 £2 19 0.75 £10 £4
7 0.1 £10 £0 20 0.9 £2 £0
8 0.25 £4 £0 21 0.9 £4 £2
9 0.25 £8 £2 22 0.9 £10 £0
10 0.25 £10 £4 23 0.95 £4 £0
11 0.5 £2 £0 24 0.95 £8 £2
12 0.5 £4 £2 25 0.95 £10 £4
13 0.5 £8 £2
p denotes the probability of the first outcome, x1
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To summarise our setup, in Part 1 we elicited risk attitudes (i.e., utility and
probability weighting parameters) for every subject, using versions of Fig. 2 and the
parameter sets of Table 1. These tasks were identical for all subjects except that the
order of tasks was randomized across subjects. In Part 2 we elicited confidence, varying
the way we did this across two between-subject treatments. In the Reported Confidence
treatment we used simple, non-incentivized self-reports. In the Inferred Confidence
treatment we used Fig. 1 and Eq. (2), using the elicited risk attitudes from Part 1 for
measuring confidence under RDU.9
After answering all quiz questions and providing their confidence levels (either by
reporting or filling in the table), subjects completed a questionnaire while we checked
their answers. Via this questionnaire, we elicited a variety of things including demo-
graphic information and a basic measure of ambiguity attitudes using a simple (non-
incentivized) version of Ellsberg’s (1961) urn problems.10 Details of the questionnaire
are provided in Appendix B. At the end of the experiment, we used a random incentive
system to pay subjects.11 Subjects were paid based on one randomly drawn row in one
randomly drawn table in one randomly drawn part of the experiment. We used physical
objects (dice, numbered balls and poker chips) to make the independence of the
randomization devices salient, and we explained the randomization procedures with
simple examples and diagrams.
The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham, CeDEx lab in 2011.
Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). In total 86 subjects participated;
40 in the Inferred Confidence treatment (25 male), and 46 in the Reported Confidence
treatment (23 male). The experiment was conducted in pen and paper format with
subjects seated in cubicles. The experiment lasted approximately 1 hour and the
average payment to participants was £9. The full experimental instructions are available
on request.
4 Results
We structure the results under three subheadings. In Section 4.1, we compare and
contrast the data on average confidence elicited in the two treatments. In Section 4.2,
we present our findings on individual risk attitudes and risk-adjusted confidence.
Finally, in Section 4.3, we examine the relationship between risk attitudes and reported
confidence.12
9 We did not randomize the order of risk and confidence elicitations since we wanted to ensure a common
experience prior to confidence measurement across treatments.
10 We included a basic tool for classifying subjects according to ambiguity attitudes because we conjectured
that such attitudes might play some role in responses to our confidence elicitation tasks. We found no evidence
to support this, however. Summary statistics of the ambiguity data are reported in Appendix B.
11 The random incentive system is a widely used experimental procedure. For a discussion of its rationale and
possible limitations see Bardsley et al. (2010).
12 Before proceeding with the analysis, we dropped the data for four quiz questions that were potentially
misleading because the success rate on each of these questions was less than 40% (whereas reported
confidence judgements were constrained to the interval 50–100%; see Appendix A). We also excluded data
from tables where subjects switched on one row and then switched back again at a later row. Reassuringly,
however, less than 2% of the tables of Part 1 and no table in Part 2 included such non-monotonic responses.
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4.1 Reproducing standard results
Figure 3 provides a quick eye-balling tool for comparing confidence measured
using non-incentivized self-reports with confidence elicited using our incentivised
mechanism (on the assumption that individuals are risk neutral). Consider first the
top left panel. This plots, for each quiz question, the mean of reported confidence
against the average success rate. The 45-degree line provides a natural benchmark
in the sense that a general tendency towards overconfidence would result in points
located above the line whereas a general tendency towards underconfidence would
result in points below it.13
The reported confidence data have a pattern consistent with the familiar ‘hard-
easy effect’. To highlight this, we have drawn a vertical (dashed) line through the
question which is the median in terms of its success rate (at around 68%). If we
define ‘hard’ (‘easy’) questions as those with lower (higher) than median success
rates it is then apparent that, on average, there is overconfidence for all but one of
the hard questions and underconfidence for all of the easy ones. For each question
we measure miscalibration bias as average confidence minus the proportion of
correct answers. We then test whether the mean of the distribution of biases is
equal to zero using a simple t-test. For easy questions there is significant
underconfidence (average bias =−0.115, p= 0.002) while for hard questions there
is significant overconfidence (average bias = 0.070, p= 0.001). Pooling hard and
easy questions we cannot reject the null of zero expected bias (average bi-
as =−0.027, p= 0.312), evidently because the negative bias on easy questions
offsets the positive bias on hard questions.
The top right panel of Fig. 3 provides corresponding analysis for confidence
inferred from our incentivised elicitation tool, but on the assumption that individ-
uals are expected value maximizers. We refer to this measure as ConfEVi and, from
expression 2 above, it is easy to see that this can be calculated directly from an
individual’s switchpoint in any given table because ConfEVi = CEi/10. Here, all of
the observations sit below the 45-degree line indicating a systematic and highly
significant tendency towards underconfidence (average bias =−0.212, p= 0.000).
The bottom two panels provide corresponding analysis, but in this case, each dot
represents a single subject with each individual’s average reported confidence across
tasks plotted against their actual success rate. For the Reported Confidence treatment,
individuals with less than median success rate are overconfident (p=0.085) and
individuals with more than median success rate are underconfident (p=0.041). For
the Inferred Confidence treatment, across all individuals, there is general
underconfidence (p=0.000).
Taken together, the results presented in Fig. 3 reproduce the standard pattern
of findings that motivated our study: using a procedure based on non-
incentivised self-reports of confidence, similar to those used in a range of
psychological studies, we reproduce a hard-easy effect; in contrast, using an
incentivised procedure to elicit confidence we find a marked tendency towards
underconfidence.
13 Histograms of average, subject-level, reported and inferred confidence are also presented in Appendix C.
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4.2 Risk preferences and risk-filtered confidence
As explained above, if individuals have non-linear utility or probability weighting
functions then confidence measures elicited via our incentivised mechanism will, in
part, reflect risk attitudes. This section takes account of this possibility by implementing
analysis to filter out the effects of risk attitudes on our incentivised confidence measures.
To this end, we exploit the data from Part 1 of the experiment to fit risk preference
models separately for each individual. As described in Section 3, we do this using one
of the leading models of risk preference, rank-dependent utility theory (RDU). We
estimate four parameters per experimental subject: the three parameters of the RDU
model (α, β, γ) assuming the power utility function (Eq. 4) and the linear-in-log-odds
probability weighting function (Eq. 5); plus the normalized standard deviation of the
decision errors (v). We omit discussion of the error distribution parameter from the
results since this is not central to our analysis.
Figure 4 summarises the results from fitting these models to individuals in our
(‘Nottingham’) study; as a benchmark for our estimates we also report parameters
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Fig. 3 Confidence and success. Top panels: Each dot represents a question. For a given question, Bias =
(Average Confidence) − (Average Success) across subjects. Average Bias is the mean across questions and the
reported p-value is for a two-tailed t-test that the mean of the distribution of biases equals zero. Bottom panels:
Each dot represents a subject. For a given subject, Bias = (Average Confidence) − (Average Success) across
questions. Average Bias is the mean across subjects and the reported p-value is for a two-tailed t-test that the
mean of the distribution of biases equals zero
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obtained by applying the same econometric method to the data reported in Bruhin et al.
(2010) and Epper et al. (2011) (these are labelled the ‘Zurich’ estimates). The results for
Nottingham and Zurich are, qualitatively, very similar. The mean of the utility function
parameter distribution is close to one and for most of the Nottingham subjects (67 out
of 86) we cannot reject the null hypothesis that α=1 at the 5% level of significance
(two-tailed test). Based on the same test procedure, however, for a very large majority
of subjects we do reject linearity of the probability weighting function: for roughly half
the subjects (44 of 86) we reject β=1; for 78 out of 86 subjects we reject γ=1 and for
all except four subjects we reject the joint hypothesis that β=γ=1.
The graph presented in Fig. 4 plots the probability weighting function based on the
median estimates of β and γ of the sample. The Nottingham and Zurich plots both
display the inverse-S shape which overweights (underweights) small (large) probabil-
ities; this is quite typical of the broader empirical literature estimating probability
weighting functions, at least for data gathered from tasks with stated (as opposed to
learned) probabilities (for a review see Starmer 2000; Fehr-Duda et al. 2006). This
correspondence between our estimates and those obtained in Zurich provides some
reassurance that our procedures for estimating the risk preference measures are reliable
(or at least comparably reliable to those based on similar procedures elsewhere in the
literature).14
The significant non-linearity in utility and probability weighting functions for the
majority of our subjects strongly suggests that risk attitudes will be a component of
confidence measured via ConfEVi. Also notice that from the bottom right panel of Fig. 3
it is apparent that ConfEVi <0.5 for a significant proportion of individuals (47.5%).
Given that each task involved a choice between two options, one of which was right,
confidence below 50% is implausibly low. In our incentivised task, however, risk
aversion (say as measured by concavity of the utility function) would tend to depress
ConfEVi. In other words, the data obtained from our incentivised mechanism might
seem more plausible were we to filter out the effect of departures from risk neutrality.
    The Mean of the Estimated Parameters  
     for Nottingham and Zurich Samples  
Nottingham 
(n=86) 
Zurich 
(n=138) 
1.047 (0.22)  1.104 (0.29)  
0.729 (0.16) 0.884 (0.17) 
0.477 (0.07) 0.533 (0.10) 
    Mean standard errors are in parentheses  0
0.1
0.2
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0.5
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0.8
0.9
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Probability Weighting Functions 
Median Parameters 
Nottingham 2011 Zurich 2006
Fig. 4 Estimates of risk preference parameters. The plot is the weighting function based on the median
estimates of β and γ of the sample
14 Histograms of the estimated parameters can be found in Appendix D.
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Using the independent measures of individuals’ risk parameters (based on responses
to Part 1 of the experiment) we estimate risk-adjusted measures of inferred confidence,
based on expression (2) above, as follows:
Conf RDUi ¼ w−1
CEi
10
 α 
¼ 1
β* CEi10
 −α−β 1γ þ 1 ð7Þ
The results of filtering out risk in this way are shown in Fig. 5. This figure plots
inferred confidence against actual success rates for each question, with separate panels
for the EV and RDU models. For comparison, we also reproduce the reported confi-
dence in the bottom panel. We observe that (i) the extent of underconfidence falls as we
move from EV to RDU (p=0.025), (ii) the difference between mean biases of reported
and inferred confidence decreases as we filter out risk attitudes (p=0.023), and (iii)
inferred confidence is significantly more noisy than reported confidence (Levene
(1960) variance equality test: p=0.009). These results suggest that, in the absence of
filters for risk attitude, the extent of underconfidence is exaggerated. By filtering out
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Fig. 5 Risk adjusted confidence and success. Each dot represents a question. For a given question, Bias =
(Average Confidence − Average Success) across subjects. Average bias is the mean across all questions and
the reported p-value is for a two-tailed t-test that the mean of the distribution of biases is zero. Absolute Bias =
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components of these measures attributable to risk attitudes, the overall mean bias falls
from −0.212 (inferred confidence under EV) to −0.086 (inferred confidence under
RDU).
While confidence miscalibration is reduced as a consequence of allowing for risk
attitudes, it is not eliminated and the mean (underconfidence) bias remains significant
for both measures of inferred confidence. Averaging across questions, subjects’ success
rates are 8.6 percentage points higher than their inferred confidences under our RDU
specification. For comparison, success rates are 2.7 percentage points higher than
reported confidence.
Note, however, that zero bias does not imply perfect calibration. If, as in the
bottom panel of Fig. 5, bias is positive for hard questions and negative for easy
questions, the average bias measure may not reveal the extent of miscalibration.
Thus, for a different overall measure of miscalibration we use the average
absolute bias (i.e., the sum of vertical deviations from the 45-degree line).
On this measure, inferred RDU confidence (11.6%) and reported confidence
(10.2%) are not significantly different (p= 0.666).
4.3 Relationship between reported confidence and risk attitudes
So far we have focussed on the relation between risk attitudes and measured
confidence elicited via an incentivised mechanism. Next we explore a possible
connection between risk attitudes and self-reported confidence. It seems plausible
to suppose that confidence might be related to risk attitudes. One reason for
thinking this flows from the fact that various popular contemporary theories of
risk preference allow departures from risk neutrality to arise as consequences of
the way that people assess and/or respond to probabilities. For example, in
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992)
decisions can be interpreted as being influenced either by misperception of
objective probabilities or by subjective attitudes to whatever probabilities are
perceived. To the extent that such processes reflect generic properties of the way
that humans perceive and respond to risks, that provides reason to expect that
similar processes might operate in relation to confidence judgements because
those judgments are assessments of probabilities. We investigate this possibility
by examining the correlation between individual level risk parameters and report-
ed confidence. Notice that, while we have a reason to believe that ConfEV and
ConfRDU may be correlated with risk attitudes because of an influence introduced
via the measurement technique, in the case of reported confidence, there is no
such transmission mechanism. As such, a correlation between risk attitudes and
reported confidence would be suggestive of an intrinsic link between confidence
and risk attitudes.
Table 2 presents the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable
is average reported confidence (subject level). The table reports two model
specifications. Model 1 uses estimated RDU parameters as regressors, and
Model 2 includes additional controls for average success rates, demographic
variables and the measure of ambiguity aversion elicited from the questionnaire.
Since some of the regressors are estimated, we use bootstrapped standard errors
to account for measurement error in the independent variables.
36 J Risk Uncertain (2016) 52:21–46
Estimates of Model 2 show no significant association between average reported
confidence levels and average success rates across subjects.15 None of the other control
variables have any significant predictive power for confidence levels. Turning to the risk
parameter estimates, curvature of the utility function is positively related to reported
confidence levels in both specifications, with greater risk seeking (as captured by higher
α) associated with higher confidence. We do not find a robust significant effect of the
probability weighting elevation parameter β.16 The significant positive effect of γ in both
specifications has a natural interpretation. Recall that γ controls curvature of the
weighting function, then notice that, for our tasks, success rates are such that we are
typically operating in a region where the median subject’s weighting function under-
weights probabilities. In this region, increases in γ reduce underweighting. Hence, the
Table 2 Dependent variable average reported confidence
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2
α 0.125*** 0.124**
(0.05) (0.055)
β 0.078 0.097
(0.05) (0.060)
γ 0.096** 0.109**
(0.051) (0.054)
Average success 0.029
(0.112)
Female −0.037
(0.028)
Age −0.013
(0.009)
Ambiguity averse −0.013
(0.032)
Constant 0.453*** 0.704***
(0.078) (0.202)
R
2
0.203 0.251
n 45 43
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance levels
Standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained by the bootstrap method with 1,000 replications
15 The lack of a significant effect may reflect low power due to our relatively limited sample size. We also
checked the relation between confidence and success in a more disaggregate analysis using responses to each
question (rather than averages) as the dependent variable. In this analysis, there is a positive and significant
association between success and expressed confidence levels; confidence is about 8.5% higher when a
subject’s answer to a question is correct. This relationship fades away in average subject-level analysis which
is consistent with the findings by e.g., Kruger and Dunning (1999) and Massoni and Roux (2012).
16 In Table 2 we report our most parsimonious model, using just the risk attitude variables, and our most
general model. We also examined intermediate cases excluding some of the questionnaire variables. We found
that the significant effects captured by α and γ are robust across model specifications, but the effect captured
by β is sensitive to model specification. For example, if the gender dummy is excluded from Model 2, β
becomes significantly positive at the 5% level. Lack of significance in this specification may also reflect low
power due to our modest sample size.
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positive sign here is consistent with a positive association between underweighting and
underconfidence.17 We believe the analysis in this section is novel, and scientifically
interesting, suggesting the possibility of common psychological mechanisms underpin-
ning risk attitudes and confidence judgements.
5 Discussion
There is a very large empirical literature investigating confidence judgements and much of
this points to the presence of overconfidence in a range of judgements or the existence of a
hard-easy effect. The bulk of this literature, however, rests on data generated from non-
incentivised self-reports of confidence. More recently, the robustness of conclusions from
this line of research has been challenged by studies from experimental economists which
use incentivised tasks to elicit confidence judgements and find that overconfidence is
considerably reduced. Indeed, in these recent studies, underconfidence is the typical finding.
Our study contributes to this literature, and its central novelty lies in combining two
key design features. First, we compare miscalibration of confidence in own absolute
performance across incentivised and non-incentivised confidence elicitation tasks.
Second, our design incorporates procedures for measuring the risk attitudes of our
participants coupled with techniques that allow us to track how filtering out risk
attitudes affects the measurement of confidence via the incentivised procedure. With
the data generated from our design, we are also able to investigate a possible link
between reported confidence and risk attitudes at the individual level.
Using a non-incentivised procedure, designed to be very similar to those used in much
of the background psychology literature, we reproduce the standard finding of a hard-easy
effect.With our new incentivised confidencemeasurement, regardless of whether or not we
filter for risk attitudes, and in line with the recent experimental economics literature, we
observe a general tendency towards underconfidence and the hard-easy effect disappears.
Our primary novel findings then relate to the impacts of risk aversion on measured
confidence. In the context of incentivised confidence elicitation, we find that filtering
out risk attitudes from inferred confidence reduces the degree of underconfidence. We
also observe a striking association between risk attitudes inferred from incentivised
decisions about lotteries and confidence measured using the non-incentivized tool.
Specifically, individuals who are more risk averse tend to express lower confidence.
As far as we know, we are the first to provide direct evidence that risk attitudes play a
significant role in determining confidence judgements. While we have argued that some
such connection is intuitively plausible, the fact that the association appears to work through
both attitudes to consequences and attitudes to chance is striking: in our data confidence is
associated with parameters of both the utility function and the probability weighting
function. In our view the discovery of an association between probability weighting and
confidence is particularly intriguing. To those who tend to think of probability weighting as
reflecting more general underlying principles of cognition, the manifestation of those
17 We also examined the relationship between reported confidence and another simple proxy for risk attitudes
represented as the individual’s average switch point (ASP) in Part 1 of the experiment. This revealed
significant positive association between ASP and reported confidence consistent with higher confidence for
less risk averse individuals. Notice that this ASP measure of risk attitude does not rely on any particular model
of risk preference. Results of this analysis are reported in Appendix E.
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principles in another domain will be reassuring but perhaps not especially surprising.
However, we suspect that many economists previously aware of evidence of probability
weighting may, quite reasonably, think of it as an essentially empirical regularity derived
mainly from observing choices among simple gambles, with stated probabilities. To those
who do interpret it in this more limited way, our results are arguably much more surprising
by establishing a clear empirical connection between responses to probabilities in two very
different domains: one involving attachment of certainty equivalents to gambles with stated
probabilities (Part 1 of our experiment); the other involving self-reported probability
judgements about one’s own success rate in a given question (Part 2 of our experiment).
We suggest that the ability of measured (non-linear) probability weighting to predict
behaviour in these very different tasks and domains is a positive signal of the explanatory
scope and significance of the concept of probability weighting within economics.
Given this association between probability weighting and confidence judgements, it is
natural to ask whether other ‘non-standard’ aspects of preference in relation to risk or
uncertainty might also co-vary with confidence judgements. In this respect, an obvious
candidate to consider is ambiguity aversion, particularly since confidence judgments appear
to be intrinsically ambiguous (as opposed to risky). Although this raises issues beyond the
boundaries of the present study, our post-experimental questionnaire did include a task
intended to assess attitudes to ambiguity. Using these data we found that subjects identified
as ambiguity averse did not switch differently in the confidence elicitation tables compared
to ambiguity neutral subjects. Nor did we find any relationship between ambiguity attitudes
and self-reported confidence. This is, of course, far from conclusive evidence that there is
no relationship to discover, and there is certainly scope for further research into this issue
and the broader question—previously highlighted by Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005);
Offerman et al. (2009) and Kothiyal et al. (2011)—of how to assess and control the
potential impact of ambiguity attitudes in the context of incentivised belief elicitation.
We conclude with a brief cautionary remark. Whether or not people’s confidence
judgements are well calibrated is clearly an important issue in a range of economically
relevant field contexts (Harrison and Phillips 2014). As such, economists have, understand-
ably, shown an interest in the large volume of evidence supporting overconfidence in the lab
and field. While it seems entirely appropriate to analyse the consequences of confidence
miscalibration, it now looks naïve to proceed, as some have done in the past, by simply
assuming overconfidence as a reasonable empirical assumption (Odean 1999; Compte and
Postlewaite 2004; Malmendier and Tate 2005; Galasso and Simcoe 2011; Gervais et al.
2011). In contrast, our results, alongside other recent work (e.g., Hoelzl and Rustichini
2005; Moore and Healy 2008; Blavatskyy 2009; Clark and Friesen 2009; Merkle and
Weber 2011), support the following conclusion: while miscalibration of confidence judge-
ments occurs and persists in controlled incentivised decisions, there is currently—and
perhaps ironically—apparent overconfidence regarding the empirical significance of over-
confidence. We hope that our work provides helpful input for recalibration.
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Appendix A: City quiz questions
Athens, Greece        Amsterdam, Netherlands   
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (23.2%)
Philadelphia, USA    Havana, Cuba
Which of the following two cities has the larger population?  (63.5%)
Los Angeles, USA   Kolkata, India    
Which of the following two cities has the larger population?  (38.1%)
Rome, Italy   Lima, Peru  
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (59.7%)
Cairo, Egypt   Brasilia, Brazil
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (57.9%)
Tehran, Iran Seattle, USA  
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (74.1%)
Warsaw, Poland   Nairobi, Kenya
Which of the following two cities has the larger population?  (57.2%)
San Diego, California, USA Dallas, Texas, USA
Which of the following two cities has the larger population?  (83.8%)
Buenos Aires, Argentina Rio De Janeiro, Brazil
Which of the following two cities has the larger population?  (45.9%)
Seoul, South Korea Singapore, Singapore
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (96.5%)
Cairo, Egypt  Shanghai, China  
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (58.4%)
Istanbul, Turkey  Sydney, Australia
(The percentages of correctly given answers are in parentheses.)
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (59.6%)
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Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (81.3%)
Lima, Peru  Sao Paolo, Brazil
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (92.8%)
Dubai, United Arab Emirates Tokyo, Japan
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (92.8%)
Mumbai, India  Berlin, Germany   
Which of the following two cities has the larger population?  (75.4%)
Paris, France Mexico City, Mexico
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (46.1%)
Budapest, Hungary Caracas, Venezuela  
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (78.2%)
Milan, Italy Malaga, Spain
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (69.2%)
Coventry, UK Leicester, UK
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (65.3%)
Oslo, Norway Stockholm, Sweden
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Appendix B: Post Study Questionnaire
1) What is your sex?        Male Female
2) What is your age?                      _____________
3) [Ellsberg’s Urn Problem:]
Suppose that you are shown a bag which contains 90 balls. Of these, 30 are red. The remaining 60 
balls are some mixture of black and yellow, but you do not know what the mixture is. One ball is 
to be drawn at random from the bag. You are asked to choose one of two options: Option I will 
give you £10 if a red ball is drawn, while Option II will give you £10 if a black ball is drawn. This 
choice may be written as follows:
Red Black Yellow
Option I £10 £0 £0
Option II £0 £10 £0
Which would you choose? Please tick the corresponding box. 
Now suppose, instead, that you are offered a different choice of options, defined in terms of the 
same draw of a ball from the same bag. You must choose one of Options III and IV:
Red Black Yellow
Option III £10 £0 £10
Option IV £0 £10 £10
Which would you choose now? Please tick the corresponding box.
Table 3 Summary statistics of descriptive variables, n = 86
Scale Mean Std error
Female Binary 0 or 1 0.44 0.50
Age Numeric Continuous 20.2 2.17
Ambiguity attitudea Qualitative Ambiguity averse,
seeking, or neutral
Averse: 55
Seeking: 1
Neutral 30
a Subjects classified according to responses in Ellsberg problems in post study questionnaire as follows:
ambiguity averse (Options I and IV chosen); ambiguity seeking (Options II and III); ambiguity neutral
(Options I and III or Options II and IV)
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Appendix C: Histograms of Average Reported Confidence and ConfEV
(Subject Level)
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Appendix D: Histograms of Risk Preference Parameters
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Appendix E: Average Switch Point as an Alternative Risk Measure
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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